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Abstract  
This case study retraces the steps of the David vs. Goliath battle between the Beijing Olympic 
Organising Committee and the Free Tibet Movement, in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics. While the Chinese government struggled to maintain message control in a bid to 
secure consistent, positive media coverage, the Free Tibet Movement has provided insight 
into an alternative approach to communicating with a truly global audience through 
engagement, participation and the strategic use of new media. This paper is neither anti-
Chinese nor pro-Tibetan, however, it highlights that large organisations and governments can 
learn from activist and pressure groups, which have become increasingly successful in 
engaging globally dispersed audiences in a cost effective way. The author argues that 
Olympic programs have focused too much on traditional marketing tools, such as sponsorship 
and sales, whilst ignoring the importance of strategic public relations programs and audience 
engagement. 
Scholarly research into activism spans over more than thirty years and represents one of the 
largest bodies of knowledge in public relations literature. However, its focus has been largely 
on damage limitation and issue management. The author calls for greater recognition of 
activists as public relations professionals in their own right, who are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated and innovative to maximise their limited funds and resources. The Free Tibet 
Movement’s Olympic Campaign provides an insightful example of how an until recently 
largely unknown collective of activist groups managed to seriously overshadow the lead up to 
the 2008 Olympic Games, effectively damaging one of the best known global brands. As 
scholars our focus should arguably not be on how to limit the scope and power of these PR 
professionals, but on what we can learn from their expertise, experience and knowledge.  
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Introduction 
The Olympic Games are one of the biggest events on the global sport and entertainment 
calendar, mesmerising athletes and couch potatoes alike. As far as brands are concerned, there 
is hardly any bigger and more recognisable than the Olympic Brand. However, in the lead up 
to the 2008 Olympic Games activist and human rights groups effectively managed to use the 
global attention and focus on China to raise awareness of their own cause and humanitarian 
issues in Taiwan, Darfur and Tibet. Whilst the Beijing Organising Committee (BOCOG) was 
preoccupied with promoting the “Torch of Freedom’s” longest ever journey around the globe, 
the David vs. Goliath battle for media attention was arguably won by the Free Tibet 
Movement (FTM), depicting the torch relay’s climb to Mount Everest as a symbol of China’s 
suppression of minority groups. This case study highlights how the Internet and new 
technologies have arguably levelled the playing field between activist and pressure groups on 
one hand, and large organisations and governments on the other. Like many old school 
management teams, the BOCOG overestimated their control over desired messages and 
predominantly relied on large marketing budgets and propaganda, assuming that these would 
secure their dominance over largely underfunded and predominantly volunteer-based activist 
groups. While large organisations and governments have largely failed to embrace new 
media, true two-way symmetrical communication and audience engagement, pressure groups’ 
innovative tools and techniques may provide new insights into how to communicate 
effectively with increasingly global audiences. 
 
Activism | Literature Review  
Public relations literature refers to activists as “collections of individuals organised to exert 
pressure on an organisation on behalf of a cause” (Grunig 1992, p. 504). This definition 
arguably includes governments, their agencies and departments, as in the case of the Chinese 
Government and the Beijing Olympic Organising Committee, which will be the focus 
throughout this case study. The issue of activism has been considered to be of critical 
importance to public relations scholars and practitioners since at least the late 19th century 
(Smith and Ferguson 2001). Scholarly research into activism spans over three decades and 
represents one of the largest bodies of knowledge in public relations literature. However,  the 
vast majority of studies are based on Grunig’s (1992) Excellence Theory  (e.g. Holtzhausen 
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2006; Grunig 1992; Grunig and Grunig 1997; Grunig 1986; Reber and Kim 2006) and thereby 
provide only a limited insight into the organisation-activist relationship (Dozier and Lauzen 
2000). The scope of scholarly research into activism has furthermore been largely restricted to 
the corporate perspective (e.g. John and Thomson 2003; Reber and Kim 2006; Grunig 1992; 
Illia 2003; Turner 2007; Bunting and Lipski 2001; Werder 2006), with a focus on issue 
management and damage limitation  (e.g. Holtz 2002; Heath 1998; Smith and Ferguson 2001; 
Karagianni and Cornelissen 2006; Grunig 1992; Guiniven 2002; Deegan 2001). Scholars have 
highlighted the need to monitor activist behaviour in order to respond to potential problems 
early (Anderson 1992; Coombs 1998) and protect the reputation of the organisation involved 
(Beder 2002). However, from the corporate PR manager perspective active stakeholders may 
even provide a range of benefits, as the threat they pose to an organisation’s prosperity and 
survival increases the pressure to establish “excellent and effective” communication 
departments (Grunig 1992; Heath 1998). This in turn enables practitioners to gain legitimacy 
and increase their utility to the organisation (Smith and Ferguson 2001). 
Whilst the majority of activism literature heavily relies on Grunig’s (1992) Excellent 
Theory’s  advocacy for symmetrical communication, the research agenda itself has been 
largely asymmetrical, thereby arguably subsidising commercial and government 
communication efforts “at the expense of other segments of the population”  (Karlberg 1996, 
p. 263). With the exception of in-class (Werder 2006) and self-administered, practitioner 
focused questionnaires (Grunig and Grunig 1997) there is a noticeable shortage of primary 
research into the organisation-activist relationship, as well as an apparent lack of a publics-
centred research agenda (Leitch and Neilson 2001). 
More recently, scholars have started to recognise activists as PR practitioners in their own 
right, whose objectives, tools and strategies are becoming increasingly sophisticated (e.g. 
Karagianni and Cornelissen 2006; Smith and Ferguson 2001; Smith 2004; Reber and Berger 
2005). However, from the activists’ perspective, public relations appears to have a largely 
negative connotation as self-serving capitalist activity (Demetrious 2006), which arguably 
emphasises the need to broaden the research agenda to include the activist practitioner’s 
perspective.  Critics of public relations (Stauber 1995; Beder 2002a; 2002b) equally argue that 
PR provides an unfair advantage, by over-emphasising the view and standpoint of the already 
powerful that have the capabilities to employ communications professionals; as did the 
Chinese Government in this case study, with a seemingly endless amount of funds made 
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available to secure the success of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The German philosopher and 
sociologist Juergen Habermas (1989) has heavily criticised the public relations function  for 
distorting the ‘public sphere’, as an arena in which issues can be freely debated (L'Etang 
2008). However, recently it has been suggested that activists’ increasingly sophisticated 
public relations efforts may have a pro-social effect (Demetrious 2008; Kovacs 2006), 
democratise decision making and public policy (Heath 1998). As a result, there has been 
increased pressure on scholars to move beyond the prevailing focus on service to the 
profession, towards the development of the discipline, by exploring the activist-organisation 
relationship from the activists’ point of view (Dozier and Lauzen 2000; Leitch and Neilson 
2001).   
 
 
Activism & Power 
Ultimately, any activist group’s success depends on their ability to access power resources, 
such as followers, funding, public support, media coverage and political champions (Heath 
1997). However, Leitch and Neilson (2001) assert that due to its failure to acknowledge the 
resources inequality between organisations and their publics, the public relations research 
agenda into the organisation-publics relationships is inherently flawed. They argue that PR 
research to date has not only widely ignored other disciplines’ research into social relations 
(e.g. political science, psychology, media studies), but furthermore failed to recognise power 
as a crucial element. Looking at alternatives, stakeholder theory underlies much of the current 
thinking and research in management and consequently public relations. Accordingly, an 
organisation’s success depends on its ability to manage the often conflicting demands of its 
various stakeholder groups. However, based on  classification systems such as Mitchell, Agle 
and Wood’s (1997) tri-dimensional approach (power, legitimacy, urgency), or Johnson, 
Scholes and Whittington’s (2006) Power/Interest Matrix, activist groups have traditionally 
been placed in the less powerful – and therefore less important - stakeholder categories.  
Traditional stakeholder maps have been organisation-centric, often failing to acknowledge 
increased engagement and exchange between different stakeholders. This view is largely 
reflected in PR theory, which frequently assumes that publics only come into existence as 
they are identifies as such (Leitch and Neilson 2001). PR professionals and scholars have 
thereby effectively ignored a vast array of interest and pressure groups that have failed to 
register on an organisation’s radar due to the perceived limited threat they represent. 
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Nevertheless, recent research has suggested that activist groups are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated (Jaques 2006), media savvy and may even benefit from the limited resources 
available to them, which in turn increases the need to become more strategic and focused 
(Kovacs 2004). According to Olson’s theory of collective action (Olson 1965), small interest 
groups can be more effective than larger and more established groups, due to the recognition 
that every individual’s support and action is crucial for the survival of the group and its cause.  
This may be partly due to the flatter structures within activist organisations, which tend to 
have only two types of members:  a steering group or leader, that make the day to day 
decisions, and ‘general members’, who predominantly provide financial support (Grunig 
1992). Additionally, new communication technologies, such as the Internet, have arguably 
helped level the power imbalance between activists and large organisations (Bunting and 
Lipski 2001; Jaques 2006; Coombs 1998; Heath 1998; Bray 1998) and have thereby enabled 
activist groups to become more effective and powerful than ever before (Blood 2001). 
Therefore, arguably not surprisingly, the largest body of knowledge in activism related 
literature investigates the emergence of new media (e.g. Denning 1999; Elliot 1997; Kozinets 
1999; Bennett 2003) and “cyberactivism” (e.g. Illia 2003; McCaughey and Ayers 2003; 
Pickerill 2003). Issue and pressure groups have been faster than corporate communicators to 
adopt online opportunities (Bunting and Lipski 2001). The reduction in constraints on 
geography, access, time and resources have effectively reduced the significance of corporate 
assets and made it easier for all stakeholders to communicate independently (Bunting and 
Lipski 2001). Previously, the fundraising and recruitment process was a time and resources 
consuming exercise, including the tedious job of handing out leaflets on street corners and 
waiting for a handful of sympathetic individuals to respond. The online environment has 
changed the process, allowing to recruit support within a matter of hours, beyond traditional 
boundaries and restrictions (Holtz 2002).  Furthermore, the Internet provides pressure groups 
with a low cost tool, enabling direct contact with other stakeholders without relying on 
(media) gatekeepers (Bray 1998; Holtz 2002; Blood 2001; Kozinets 1999). Thereby, it 
arguably enables activist organisations to effectively turn the traditional, organisation-centric 
stakeholder map on its head, by re-designing their own map, in which corporate and 
government entities feature as only potential stakeholders, alongside supporters, sponsors and 
other (competing) activist organisations.  
 
For example, the Internet played a central role in the campaign by the Free Burma Coalition 
during 1993 to 1997, which eventually pressured PepsiCo into leaving Burma, “thereby 
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reducing the foreign investment capital used to help support the highly repressive SLORC 
dictatorship in Myanmar” (Coombs 1998, p. 296). Whilst their efforts were traditionally 
restricted to discussion groups and emails, activist campaigns are becoming more creative, 
endorsing interactive communication channels provided by Web2.0 technology, as 
demonstrated in Greenpeace’s 2008 "Dove Onslaught(er)" campaign against deforestation in 
Indonesia. With the help of strong visuals and the extensive use of social media the campaign 
team managed to recruit tens of thousands of protest emails from around the world over a two 
week period, which resulted in Dove’s parent company Unilever’s support for an immediate 
moratorium on deforestation for palm oil in South East Asia (see 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/campaigns/forests/asia-pacific/dove-palmoil-action). 
Rutherford’s (2000) case study about the International Mine Ban Treaty furthermore 
showcases how the Internet can help pressure groups to increase their capabilities by forming 
international coalitions. 
 
This case study analyses the activities by the Free Tibet Movement (FTM) in the lead up to 
the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, highlighting how a collective of activist organisations 
effectively managed to use the global spotlight on China to raise awareness of their own 
cause. The focus will be particularly on Students for a Free Tibet (SFT), a New York based 
organisation with 650 chapters worldwide, which was one of the most visible and outspoken 
groups during this period. Activists’ PR efforts have long been underestimated and 
overlooked. However, this case study calls for a change in attitude, away from the traditional 
focus on limiting activists’ scope and power towards recognition of activists unique expertise, 
experience and knowledge.  
The Olympic Spirit 
Despite earlier struggles, the Olympic Games have developed into one of the world’s most 
recognisable global brands, and a key event on the international sporting and events calendar 
(Amis and Cornwell 2005), anticipated by athletes, sport enthusiasts and coach potatoes alike. 
Olympic Games programs are highly marketing focused and sophisticated, rising billions of 
dollars from international sponsorship deals, broadcasting partners, licensing and ticket sales 
(International Olympic Committee 2001). Benefits for local host are also apparent, with a 
significant impact on tourism (International Olympic Committee 2001). For example, the 
2000 Sydney Olympic Games’ local marketing programs generated nearly US$1.1 billion 
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(International Olympic Committee 2001), resulted in and estimated 1.74million additional 
visitors and effectively advanced the Brand Australia by ten years (Australian Tourist 
Commission 2001). Attributes most closely associated with the Olympic image are positive, 
emotional and aspirational; such as being the best, trustworthy, inspirational, peaceful, 
honourable, participation and striving (International Olympic Committee 2001, p. 9).  One of 
the most powerful symbols for the Olympic spirit is the Olympic torch, representing freedom, 
a lack of cultural barriers and harmony. The symbol of the torch arguably highlights one of 
the key reasons why China was eager to host the 2008 Olympic Games, not motivated by 
financial gain, but by the opportunity to showcase the “new China”, aligned with the Olympic 
attributes (Clifford 2008). However, instead of celebrating China’s year in the spotlight, the 
lead up to the Olympics was overshadowed by growing calls for boycotts of the 2008 games, 
in protest against China’s alleged poor human rights record and in response to recent 
disturbances in Tibet, Darfur and Taiwan, going as far as calling for a complete boycott of 
Chinese goods (Friends of Tibet India). Pressure also increased on politicians, presidents and 
heads of state around the world, with many vowing to stay away from the opening ceremony. 
The Olympic Games are not new to criticism, controversy and negative connotations, most 
commonly relating to perceived commercialism and the politicising of the event itself (Roche 
2002; Lenskyj 2000).  Politics have frequently played a major part in Olympic Games, most 
notoriously during the 1936 summer Olympics in Berlin, which were used as a propaganda 
tool by the German Nazi Party. The Olympic Games are equally not new to activist 
involvement and pressure groups. During the 1972 Munich games - intended to present a new, 
democratic and optimistic Germany to the world - 11 Israeli athletes were killed by 
Palestinian terrorists. Eight years later, 65 athletes refused to compete at the Moscow 
Olympics, countered by further boycotts of the 1984 Olympic Games (Senn 1999). As a 
result, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has been working hard to establish the 
Olympic Games as a neutral event, celebrating unity, peace and inspiration. The torch 
continues to be upheld as symbol of freedom and the Olympic spirit.    
2008 Beijing Olympics | A showcase for the ‘New China’ 
On 13th July 2001, Beijing was awarded the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games, as only 
the third Asian summer location after Tokyo in 1964 and Seoul in 1988 (Pollock, Kreuer, and 
Ouano 1997). However, this was not China’s first attempt at becoming an Olympic host. Its 
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1991 application to sponsor the 27th Olympics failed, amid concerns by the Olympic 
committee that China would not be able to guarantee uncensored media access, the right to 
protest and general freedom of expression. For its second attempt Beijing recruited 
professional advice in the form of Weber Shandwick, a leading global public relations firm 
(Clifford 2008), which claims winning the bid for the 2008 games by separating China’s 
“human rights record from its Olympic bid”  (David Liu, Managing Director for Weber 
Shandwick China, quoted in: Clifford 2008). The key rationale was that by being thrust it into 
the International spotlight, China would be forced to engage with the rest of the world. 
Secretary-general of the Beijing bid organizing committee, Wang Wei, stated at the 
announcement in Moscow that a “nod for Beijing would mean enhancement [in China] in 
education, medical benefits, as well as human rights"(quoted in: Lam 2001). He furthermore 
pledged there would be no restrictions on foreign press, covering the event, a commitment 
that would later on create major headaches for both the protective Chinese government and 
the International Olympic Committee. 
 
Chinese coverage during the lead up to the Olympic Games made it very clear that while 
China strived to be associated with the Olympic symbolism of unity, freedom and peace, it 
was not prepared to accept any criticism. Hosting the Games was an issue of national pride. 
An impressive amount of resources was made available for new infrastructure and the smooth 
running of the games. The Beijing Government was determined that nobody would be able to 
threaten its pride nor the Olympic Spirit (Hutzler 2007; The Beijing Organizing Committee 
2008). Consequently, any 'politicising' of the 2008 Games was automatically condemned. The 
Olympics were seen as a showcase for the “new China”,  characterised by the economic boom 
and poverty reduction, but they increasingly developed into a magnet for protesters and critics 
of the Chinese government, which closely controls political organisations and protests in the 
country (Dyer and McGregor 2008). In the lead up to the Olympics the media largely focused 
on China’s poor human rights track record, particularly in Taiwan, Darfur and mostly in 
Tibet. This perceived Western media bias was highly criticised by China  (Dyer and 
McGregor 2008) and in return resulted in demonstrations (Bachelor 2008) and even boycotts 
around the world (Carrefour sees Chinese boycott over Tibet 2008). China was determined to 
ensure that the 2008 Olympics would be a success, whatever the price tag may be.  
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The Free Tibet Movement | Sizing the opportunity to create global awareness 
In contrast to China’s strong position as resources rich Olympic host, the Free Tibet 
Movement’s (FTM) fight was seemingly lost the moment Beijing’s endorsement as 2008 
Olympic host was announced. After decades of campaigning for Tibet’s self-determination 
(Bob 2005), the announcement came as a big ‘blow’. Worldwide there is a large array of 
organisations supporting Tibet’s independence in one form or another. 153 of these are 
currently listed as members of the London-based International Tibet Support Network. As for 
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (Rutherford 2000), the coalition provides these 
groups with a global platform and opportunities that would otherwise not be available due to 
limited funds, heavy dependency on individual donations and consequently reliance on media 
coverage to ensure their voice is being heard. The initial focus of the various groups was on 
preventing the Olympic Games from being awarded to China. However, after an initial period 
of disbelief and disappointment the movement realised that a unique opportunity was 
presenting itself as China was being thrust into the global spotlight. “At first there was a 
profound sense of despair after the Chinese government was awarded the honor,” said 
Kalaya’an Mendoza, a coordinator for Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) (quoted in: Clifford 
2008). “But after five minutes passed, we realized this would be a monumental opportunity 
for the Tibetan people to be put in the international spotlight.” 
 
The Chinese government effectively underestimated the FTM’s strategic planning capabilities 
and endurance. No sooner as Beijing was announced as the 2008 Olympic host, Tibet support 
groups around the world held a series of public relations strategy sessions (Clifford 2008; 
Saunders 2008). Like other NGOs, pressure and activist groups, the FTM has become 
increasingly strategic and sophisticated, not just in their techniques but also in their planning 
capabilities (Guiniven 2002; Bob 2005; Reber and Kim 2006). From the start, the FTM found 
itself in a weak and disadvantaged position, lacking not only funds, but being furthermore 
based outside Tibet, with a large following of non-Tibeteans, which could have easily 
undermined their credibility. However, the FTM managed to ensure that their messages were 
heard, by engaging their global audience with the help of new communication technologies.  
The BOCOG also recognised the Internet as a major communications tool, creating sleek, 
information rich websites with up to date news, a count down to the Games, weather updates, 
photos, discipline specific information and ticketing details (see http://en.beijing2008.cn). 
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However, it effectively failed to recognise interactive tools provided by Web2.0 technology 
and thereby to encourage any engagement with its global audience. In direct contrast to this, 
the FTM deliberately played out its campaign in the public domain. One of the most visible 
groups has been the Students for a Free Tibet (SFT). The New York based organisation has 
650 chapters worldwide, and a highly visible leadership team, including Lhadon Tethong, its 
ethnic Tibetan, Canadian born Executive Director. SFT is a perfect example of what Reber 
and Berger (2005) would describe as a PR savvy activist organisation. As a student focused 
organisation, SFT is surprisingly sophisticated and strategic. The SFT website itself provides 
a comprehensive guide to successful campaigning, including advice on creating strategic 
campaigns, media training and action ideas. The group also offers internships and organises 
bi-annual, week-long “action camps”, including workshops on grassroots  fundraising, media 
training, political theatre and campaign planning (including site management) (Clifford 2008). 
Additionally, SFT has fully endorsed the Internet as a low-cost communication channel and 
has effectively expanded its dialogic features, for both supporters and the media. Its Beijing 
Campaign designated website (http://freetibet2008.org) contains toolkits, downloadable 
posters, sign up sheets and an array of logos in various formats and sizes. It also provides 
supporters with access to an online merchandise shop and a global event calendar. Most 
importantly, the website includes streams from various blog sites and actively encourages 
feedback. New recruits and first time visitors can join the Action Network via email, opt in to 
receive text message updates or simply gain further information via various videos updates, 
FAQs and background pages. Journalists can gain easy access to the up to date media centre 
including press releases and images, or enter their details to subscribe to SFT media updates. 
International media spokespeople are made easily accessible and even their credentials are 
available on request. Throughout the campaign, Lhadon was highly visible via her personal 
blog (http://beijingwideopen.org/), phone-in interviews from IOC meetings, YouTube 
recordings of media conferences and live streaming from important events. Media coverage 
went beyond online and underground publications to include international names such as the 
Business Week, The Age, the New York Times and the BBC, to name only a few. Similarly, 
regular email alerts to SFT supporters were personalised and went beyond plain text, 
including images, links to past coverage, supporting profiles, video footage and photos of 
recent campaigns. Alerts also usually contained a call to action, ranging from recruiting an 
“Olympic Athlete to Stand up for Tibet in Beijing”, to contacting the local IOC 
representative, or signing a petition aimed at torch relay sponsors. Feedback and interaction 
have been encouraged and appeared to be left uncensored, apart from peer ratings and 
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comments on YouTube. SFT have also increasingly been using social networking sites such 
as Facebook, text messages, emails and bulletins to organise themselves at their various 
protest locations.  
Let the Games being | A David vs. Goliath battle for attention 
Unlike many other likeminded groups, SFT have not solely relied on generating media 
coverage. Instead, the group has effectively used new technologies to devise strategic 
campaigns, which enable direct engagement with other stakeholders (Holtz 2002), such as key 
Olympic sponsors and partners (Branigan and Kelso 2008; McDonald to the protester target 
2008), as well as IOC officials. For example, a SFT delegation participated in targeting 
shareholders at the Coca Cola annual general meeting; not to stop the sponsor’s longstanding 
involvement with the Olympic Games, but to encourage the company to use its power as 
supporting partner of the torch relay to pressurise China and the IOC to reroute the relay, 
omitting the Tibetan leg (Kemp 2008). SFT supporters also travelled to Athens, both for the 
start of the torch relay, resulting in powerful media images as protesters were carried away, as 
well as to publicly confront IOC President Jaques Rogge. By targeting these groups directly, 
SFT did not only make its voice heard, it effectively turned the traditional, organisation-
centric stakeholder map on its head, effectively leaving the largely uncooperative BOCOG 
aside, whilst opening up alternative, more direct communication channels with other key 
stakeholders. Coverage of public actions has been made available via social media channels, 
such as YouTube, in which SFT representatives appear highly focused, media trained, rational 
and prepared.  
From a public relations perspective, SFT and the Free Tibet Movement offered the better, 
more engaging campaign, whilst the BOCOG relied on traditional marketing tools, large 
budgets and propaganda. The results were severe. Whilst the Free Tibet Movement enjoyed 
extensive, global media attention, including full colour front page coverage in the New York 
Times, it took away some of the carefully manufactured sparkle of the Beijing 2008 brand. As 
China was battling with negative media reports following the attitude of the blue-tracksuit 
clad ‘protectors’ of the Olympic Torch (Nicholson 2008) and the reported aggressive stance 
by individual, emotional China supporters along the torch relay route - arguably standing in 
direct contrast to the promised “Journey of Harmony” - the FTM appears to have clearly won 
the battle for positive, emotional coverage in the non-Chinese media. The FTM caused major 
headaches for a range of longstanding Olympic sponsors, including Coca Cola, Adidas, and 
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McDonalds. Following national pressure, British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown and German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel vowed not to attend the Opening Ceremony, with many other 
leaders at least threatening similar action. In Australia, swimming legend Dawn Fraser 
publicly announced her decision to boycott the Olympic Games, followed by a wide range of 
international athletes, who at least made their opinion and support for the FTM heard in the 
lead up to the games. SFT furthermore received sufficient donations to book two full page ads 
in the New York Times, with the aim to recruit an athlete as spokesperson, which in turn 
generated more international media coverage.  
From the BOCOG’s perspective, the power of public relations did not go completely 
unnoticed. Weber Shandwick was partly credited for winning the Olympic bid, but was 
eventually replaced by another global communications network, Hill and Knowlton, which 
specifically worked on the games (Clifford 2008; Magee 2008). Instead of celebrating its time 
in the global spotlight, China found itself increasingly on the defensive, prompting the 
government to hire additional international public relations expertise in the wake of the Tibet 
crisis, only months before the opening ceremony (Centre for Media and Democracy 2008; 
Pickard and McGregor 2008). However, the limited power of the public relations team is best 
described by the words of James B Heimowitz, Hill and Knowlton’s Chief Executive, North 
Asia Operations, who described their influence on  Olympic messages as limited, as “the 
organising committee [was] not empowered to comment on Chinese government policy 
(quoted in: Clifford 2008). Operating on a world stage means that the Chinese Government 
simply could not rely on controlling messages released by government ministries or its 
Olympic media team. Controlling internal media has been Beijing’s strength; however, it has 
largely failed to understand the challenges and opportunities presented by the rise of the 
Internet, citizen journalism and increasingly sophisticated activist groups, which are prepared 
to involve their global audience.  
With the aid of new media and stakeholder engagement SFT won not only the battle for 
media coverage, but also for public sympathy, at the expense of the Olympic Games' 
historical values. By doing so, they did not only upstage the BOCOG, but also other activist 
groups concerned with related causes, such as humanitarian issues in Darfur and Taiwan. 
With the aid of a sophisticated campaign and powerful imagery, the 'Torch of Freedom' was 
effectively turned into a symbol of suppression.  
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Conclusion 
Activist groups and grassroots movements have traditionally been placed in the less powerful 
stakeholder categories. However, this case study highlights how with the emergence of the 
Internet and particularly Web2.0 technology the Free Tibet Movement effectively moved 
beyond its role as dependent stakeholder. Instead, groups have increasingly shifted their 
attention towards their own stakeholders and (global) recruitment of supporters. As a result, 
the traditional organisation-stakeholder relationship has arguably been turned on its head and 
the BOCOG's stakeholder map re-arranged. Findings of this case study cannot be generalised 
to other activist groups beyond Students for a Free Tibet. However, this paper aims to provide 
valuable insights for large organisations and governments in their quest to engage 
stakeholders and to effectively communicate their vision and values. The FTM have 
demonstrated how with the aid of new technologies and sophisticated stakeholder 
communication a resource-poor activist group can effectively shift the focus from a global, 
mainstream event to a humanitarian cause, which was largely unknown prior to the Olympics.  
 
Further research 
Despite representing one of the most extensive bodies of knowledge in public relations 
literature, scholarly research into activism has been largely focused on damage limitation and 
issues management. In order to develop as a critical, recognisable discipline in its own right, 
public relations scholars need to move beyond their focus on service to the discipline, towards 
genuine recognition of the public in public relations (Karlberg 1996). Over the past years 
scholars have increasingly recognised activists as public relations professionals in their own 
right. However, overall there is an apparent lack of primary data and actual first hand insights 
from ‘activists’. The majority of literature focuses on case studies based on secondary data 
analysis (e.g. Coombs 1998; Grunig 1986, 1992; Hearit 1999; Henderson 2005; Karagianni 
and Cornelissen 2006; Rutherford 2000; Anderson 1992; Demetrious 2008) and conceptual 
papers (e.g. Dhir 2007; Shenkin and Coulson 2007; Derville 2005; Jones 2002; Demetrious 
2006), with a particular focus on media (e.g. Reber and Berger 2005), website (e.g. Reber and 
Kim 2006; Taylor, Kent, and White 2001) and literature reviews (e.g. Smith 2004; Smith and 
Ferguson 2001). The author argues that in order to truly grow our understanding of activism, 
we need to start looking at the activist-organisation relationship from the activist’s point of 
view.  
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